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Abstract—Regular and uninterrupted operation of critical in-
frastructures such as power, transport, communication etc. are
essential for proper functioning of a country. Cyber-attacks
causing disruption in critical infrastructure service in the past,
are considered as a significant threat. With the advancement
in technology and the progress of the critical infrastructures
towards IP based communication, cyber-physical systems are
lucrative targets of the attackers. In this paper, we propose
a robust multivariate intrusion detection system called RAD
for detecting attacks in the cyber-physical systems in O(d)
space and time complexity, where d is the number parameters
in the system state vector. The proposed Intrusion Detection
System(IDS) is developed in an unsupervised learning setting
without using labelled data denoting attacks. It allows a
fraction of the training data to be corrupted by outliers or
under attack, by subscribing to robust training procedure.
The proposed IDS outperforms existing anomaly detection
techniques in several real-world datasets and attack scenarios.
Index Terms—Robust Anomaly Detection, Critical Infrastruc-
tures, Intrusion Detection System, Robust Outlier Detection,
Unsupervised Learning, Robust Principal Component Analysis,
SCADA, PLC, MODBUS.
1. Introduction
The entire economy of a nation is dependent upon
the proper functioning of the critical infrastructure. The
critical infrastructures include health care, manufacturing,
water treatment, transportation, and power system. Even a
short disruption in the service of critical infrastructures can
affect public life severely. With the advancement network
technology in the Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition
(SCADA) [2] systems, an essential component of any crit-
ical infrastructure, IP based communication has replaced
serial communication, exposing the system to the attackers
over the IP networks. With IP convergence networks got
further integrated with the IT network, inviting adversaries
outside operational technology (OT) networks. There is an
immediate need to detect the attacks in these systems and
generate an alert in real-time. In order to generate real time
alerts, the IDS is constrained by low time complexity during
the test phase.
The operational technology of a cyber-physical system
ensures proper functioning of the system without consid-
ering the external factors like security. As a result many
security vulnerabilities exist in the cyber-physical systems.
For example in the industrial communication protocol like
MODBUS, the packets are not encrypted and do not have
any authorization mechanism to validate the sender, thus
making the protocol vulnerable to Man In The Middle
(MITM) attack or false data injection. The vulnerabilities
like remote code execution(RCE), improper credential man-
agement, stack & buffer overflow, and memory corruption
make the SCADA software and Human Machine Inter-
faces(HMI) devices easy target for the attackers. Since,
changing all the equipment in the existing infrastructure
with updated and secured protocols are time-consuming and
expensive, we developed a solution that can retrofit with the
existing systems to protect the system with the detection of
attacks in real-time.
There are two kind of approaches in designing an IDS,
model-driven approach and data-driven approach. Model-
driven based IDS consists of rules that continuously checks
system dynamics are not violated. The IDS used in Industrial
Control System(ICS) are generally model driven as the
system can be modeled using laws of physics. Often, these
systems are large and complex, consisting of many physical
parameters that are measured by sensors and controlled by
actuators. Manually identifying rules to model the behavior
of these complex systems is often not feasible. The data-
driven approach helps us in capturing ICS behavior and
understanding the underlying system dynamics. In real-time,
when the system functioning deviates from the modeled
behavior beyond a predetermined threshold, it is considered
an anomaly.
With advancements in the field of machine learning and
deep learning, many data-driven based IDS were introduced.
As, such intrusion detection methods are dependent on the
data, there are some challenges and concerns. These are:
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• The unavailability of properly labeled data classify-
ing the cyber-physical system behavior.
• Most machine learning and deep learning-based IDS
are not outlier and adversary resistant. Since training
data might be corrupted, robustness of these detec-
tion mechanisms are not guaranteed.
• The use of highly sophisticated machine learning
or deep learning models may not be feasible in a
resource-constrained deployment environment.
In this paper, our work focuses on devising a robust
anomaly detection algorithm that will learn the stable struc-
ture of the cyber-physical system and detect anomaly when
the system behavior deviates from the modeled behavior
learned by the algorithm. The stable behaviour of the cyber-
physical system is captured in a low dimensional sub-
space, by applying the Robust Principal Component Anal-
ysis (RPCA) technique. The vector comprising of readings
from sensors and actuators associated with the system, is
projected in the low dimensional subspace and their median
is computed. At the test phase, vectors are projected in the
low-dimensional subspace, and based on the distance of the
test vector from the median anomaly is flagged. The main
contributions of this paper are:
• We propose Robust Anomaly Detection (RAD), a
multivariate model to detect anomaly in the behavior
of a cyber-physical system.
• The proposed intrusion detection model is robust to
corruption in training data (e.g poisoning attack or
Gaussian noise) and it is outlier resistant. It does not
require labeled training data.
• The IDS developed requires very limited memory in
deployment and it is time efficient, making it suitable
for real-time anomaly detection.
• The proposed method retrofits to the existing infras-
tructure of an ICS.
• We demonstrate effectiveness of RAD using several
real world datasets.
2. Background and Related Work
With the rapid progress towards industry 4.0 and IP-
convergence the risk of cyber-attacks in the cyber-physical
systems are increasing every day. Since chances of state-
sponsored attacks on the cyber-physical systems are high,
proper detection and prevention mechanism needs to be
in place to protect these infrastructures. There has been
a significant amount of research going on in this area,
researchers from different backgrounds have proposed in-
trusion detection mechanisms for the cyber-physical sys-
tems. Goldenberg et al. [2] proposes a deterministic finite
automata (DFA) based intrusion detection system, where
network traffic of the cyber-physical system is modeled by
the DFA. However, construction of minimal-sized DFA, that
reaches a accepting state when the system is under normal
behavior and reaches a non-desired or dead state when the
system behaves maliciously, is NP-hard. DFA based IDS
are highly sensitive and have a high rate of false-positives.
Cheng et al. [11] proposed an finite-state automata (FSA)
based intrusion detection mechanisms similar to [2], but it
is designed to model the control flow of the program, e.g.
the system calls, API calls, and memory addresses referred
in the cyber-physical system. The IDS proposed by Cheng
et al. [11] has significant overhead and time constraints
because of continuous monitoring of the software system
calls. It has a limited ability to detect attacks as it only
detects when the attacker changes the execution control flow
in the cyber-physical system. Adepu et al. [5] proposed an
invariant based technique for generating alarms, which is
activated when the system violates the invariant derived from
different system variables. To generate the correct invariants,
the intrusion detection developer must have detailed knowl-
edge about the cyber-physical system dynamics.
Bernabeu et al. [1] developed an intrusion detection
mechanism based on a decision tree algorithm for the power
grid. They demonstrate an interesting fact about how the
critical points in the power-grid changes during different
environmental scenarios and the necessity of different in-
trusion detection models in different seasons. Hence, the
supervised learning based intrusion detection mechanisms
need to be updated with properly labeled data of normal and
attack classes, at different environmental conditions. How-
ever, the availability of adequately labeled data of cyber-
physical systems at different conditions is a considerable
challenge.
Since the availability of adequately labeled data of
cyber-physical system behavior is a challenge, various
anomaly-based intrusion detection systems are proposed.
The idea behind any anomaly-based intrusion detection
mechanism is to model normal behaviour of the cyber-
physical system in training time and measure the deviation
from the normal behavior during the run-time. If the measure
of the deviation crosses the pre-determined threshold, the
anomaly is flagged. Time-series prediction using recurrent
neural network (RNN) and long short term memory(LSTM)
models were used for anomaly-based intrusion detection [7],
[8], [14], [15]. In such cases a time-series forecasting model
for each system variable is trained using the normal system
behaviour. At each time step, the model predicts the next
reading of the system variable. If the difference between
the actual reading and the predicted reading is more than a
predetermined threshold, then anomaly is flagged.
An underlying assumption behind developing these
anomaly-based IDS is that the data used for training the
models is outlier free. This may not be the case in a
practical setting, due to malfunctioning of different sensors,
resulting corruption or missing data in the training dataset.
The presence of outliers in the training set may profoundly
affect performance and accuracy of the IDS. Aoudi et al.
[10] proposed PASAD, an anomaly-based IDS in which for
each variable, the time-series data is converted to a Hankel
matrix. A low-dimensional subspace is then identified using
SVD, that captures the stable structure of the cyber-physical
system dynamics. Since SVD is sensitive to the outlier, the
method is not robust to the outliers present in the training
Figure 1. Architecture of the integrated SCADA software & IDS within SCADA host
data. Moreover, the distance of a vector in the projected
space is computed with respect to the pre-computed mean.
Since, mean can be corrupted by a single outlier, the method
is not robust in the training time. It is also models each
sensors separately, thus multiple models need to be trained
and deployed for detecting the attacks in the overall infras-
tructure, rendering it in-feasible in a resource constrained
environment.
The ideas in [6], [13] are similar to that of in [7],
[8], [14], [15] but uses a multivariate setting. The mul-
tivariate IDS solves the problem of deploying separate
models for each sensor, thus can be deployed in a real-
time resource-constrained environment. However, the as-
sumptions of outlier-free training data and entire training
data belonging to a normal class, persists. Therefore, these
IDS can not guarantee robustness essential for a practical
scenario.
3. System Architecture
In our work, the communication link between the PLC
and SCADA is considered as the threat vector. Due to vul-
nerable industrial communication protocols like MODBUS,
command injection, false data injection, replay, and MITM
attacks are possible. It enables the attacker to change the
dynamics of the system. Also, some network-based attacks
on actuation signals will change the dynamics, and hence
even if the sensor data is correct, but the attack now reflects
in the changing dynamics of the cyber-physical system.
The attack scenarios are generated by manipulating the
sensor and actuator values in the data packets communicated
between the PLC and SCADA (false data injection attack).
Any number of sensors, actuators or their combinations can
be modified, representing attack scenarios or undesired state
for the cyber-physical system. The SCADA host collects
complete data of the infrastructure and maintains the overall
state of the system. IDS is deployed within SCADA reads
the measurement of the sensors and actuators from the
database to determine whether current behavior of the cyber-
physical system is normal or anomalous.
Figure 1 describes the data flow between different com-
ponents within the SCADA host. All the sensors and actu-
ators readings, along with the timestamp, are logged into
the historian server. The SCADA software reads the data
from the historian server to monitor the current system state.
Proposed IDS deployed in the SCADA host, reads the data
from the historian server in real-time, calculates the anomaly
score, and sends the necessary information to the notification
system, and stores it in the event log database.
The proposed IDS developed by considering the system
behavioral characteristics will help to defend the infrastruc-
ture against the attackers, trying to change the state of the
system to an undesirable state by manipulating the system
dynamics.
4. Proposed Methodology
Intrusion detection in a cyber-physical system is a gen-
eral anomaly detection problem. Deep learning and ma-
chine learning techniques are widely used to for anomaly
detection. However, specific security issues exist in these
techniques, which may enable the attacker to create carefully
crafted inputs, such that the intrusion detection mechanisms
fails to classify it as an anomaly. Therefore, robustness of
the intrusion detection mechanisms is essential to protect the
model against outliers and poisoning of the training data.
The stable behavior of a cyber-physical system can
be captured by projecting the system state vectors into a
low-dimensional subspace and localizing it there. Since the
system state vectors are observed at multiple time instance,
they in general have redundancy. Projecting them to low
dimensional subspace using a clever approach helps to get
rid the possible corruptions present in the data. The anoma-
lous behavior of the system can then be detected when the
system departures from the modeled behavior.
4.1. The Robust Anomaly Detection (RAD) algo-
rithm
The first phase of devising the anomaly detection algo-
rithm is to extract the stable structure of the cyber-physical
system. Let xi denote a d dimensional system state vector,
representing the reading of the all the sensor and actuators at
ith time stamp. The data matrix M is formed by stacking xis
as rows for m time instances. Therefore, M is a multivariate
time series data where each column represents time series
reading of a particular sensor or actuator and each row
represents the reading of all the sensors and actuators at
a particular time stamp. The data matrix M is (m ∗ d)
dimension where d is the total number of sensors and
actuators and m is the length of time series.
M =

x11 x21 x31 . . . xd1
x12 x22 x32 . . . xd2
x13 x23 x33 . . . xd3
. . .
. . .
. . .
x1m x2m x3m . . . xdm

Each matrix element xij represents the reading of the
ith sensor at jth time step.
4.1.1. Approximating stable behaviour of the system
using robust principal component analysis. Since the
cyber-physical system has a stable behavior under normal
operating circumstance, the data observed by the system
state vector should lie in a low dimensional subspace. PCA
is a widely used technique for dimensionality reduction, but
it is highly outlier sensitive. The low dimensional subspace
of the data can be determined by Robust PCA [19], which
will make the intrusion detection mechanism resistant to
outliers and poisoning of the training data. To recover the
principal components of a matrix M inspite the corruption
present in the matrix, we wanted to solve:
minimize rank(L)
subject to M = L+ S0
where S0 is a sparse corruption matrix and L is the low
rank matrix. But the above problem is non-convex and ill-
posed. We instead solve a convex relaxation of the problem,
which is called Principal Component Pursuit(PCP). PCP
minimizes a weighted combination of the nuclear norm and
l1 norm of S0. Solving the relaxed version ensures that we
will be able to recover the principal components of the data
matrix even if some of the entries in the matrix are corrupt
or outliers.
PCP optimization problem. PCP solves the following
convex optimization problem in order to perform RPCA:
minimize ||L||∗ + λ||S0||1
subject to L+ S0 =M
The above optimization problem is a convex relaxation
of finding low-rank L and sparse S0 because:
• The nuclear norm of the L matrix is the sum of the
singular values of L. The number of non-zero sin-
gular values is the rank of a matrix. By minimizing
the nuclear norm, we try to indirectly ensure L is
low rank.
• Minimizing the l1 norm of the matrix S0, indirectly
ensures sparsity of S0.
The convex PCP problem is solved using augmented
Lagrangian multiplier method.
4.1.2. Representation of stable behaviour of the Cyber-
Physical System. We obtain the low rank matrix L,
let us denote each row the matrix by Li, which is the
low rank representation of the data point xi. The basis
vectors of L span a low dimensional subspace say S. The
basis vectors are ortho-normalized using GramSchmidt
orthogonalization method. Assume, {v1,v2, · · · ,vk} be
the set of orthonormal basis vectors derived by applying
Gram-Schmidt method. This orthonormal basis vectors
are organized in the form of column vectors into a matrix A.
The orthogonal projection of a vector x on the subspace
S, spanned by orthonormal vectors of the matrix A is
defined by:
ProjA(x) = A(A
TA)−1ATx = AATx
In the projection operator we have used the orthonor-
mal property of the basis vectors {v1,v2, · · · ,vk}, giving
ATA = Ik. Using the projection operator ProjA(·), the
training vectors {xi}mi=1 are projected into low-dimensional
subspace S, where vector xi consists of reading actuators
and sensors at ith timestamp. For each xi in the training
dataset, let
zi = ProjA(xi) = A(A
Txi)
where zi is the projection of xi in the subspace S. The xi’s
are projected in the low-dimensional subspace because the
ProjA(xi) is the closest point of xi in the subspace S.
We then take the geometric median of the projected
points:
m = argmin
y
m∑
i=1
||zi − y||2
Weiszfeld algorithm is a standard tool to compute the above
median. The stable behavior of the cyber-physical system
is represented by the median m. In order to detect the state
of the system in the run-time, we need to project a state
vector into the low-dimensional space S, then compute its
euclidean distance from the pre-computed median m.
4.1.3. Determining the value of threshold θ. The geomet-
ric median, m of the projected data points can be considered
as a robust central tendency measure for the projected
training data points. We set the value of the threshold as
highest distance of low rank representation of any point in
the training data Li from the geometric median
θ = max
i∈[m]
||m− Li||2
In the low dimensional subspace S, the hyper-sphere cen-
tered at median m with radius equals threshold θ, is the
region of stable behaviour for the cyber-physical system. If
projection of any data point at the test-time lies outside this
hyper-sphere, it is flagged as an anomaly.
4.1.4. Classification of the test data point. The stable be-
havior of the cyber-physical system is parameterized by the
triplet {A,m, θ}. Consider a test point xj, RAD computes
the anomaly score aj using:
aj = ||m−A(ATxj)||2
and compares it with the threshold θ. If the anomaly score
aj is higher than the threshold θ, then the data point xj is
flagged as an anomaly.
4.2. Time & Space Analysis
We consider the time and space requirement for deploy-
ing the proposed RAD intrusion detection system. Since we
need to store the triplet {A,m, θ}, we shall require space
O(d · r), A being a d × r dimensional and m being d
dimensional. Apart from that, we shall require to store an
r dimensional intermediate projection vector ATxj and a
d dimensional test data point xj. Hence the overall space
complexity of the deployment is O(d · r), where r is the
rank of the low dimensional subspace S. Consider the steps
involved in classifying a test data point:
• To compute the projection A(ATxj)of a data point
xj , we need two matrix vector multiplication. Thus,
time complexity of the projection step is O(d · r).
• Computing the anomaly score would require O(d)
time, as median m is d dimensional.
With comparison with threshold taking O(1) time, the
time complexity of our proposed IDS is O(d · r). Since, r
can be considered constant, the proposed method is said to
work in O(d) space and time complexity.
5. Experiments & Results
To evaluate the performance and accuracy of the pro-
posed intrusion-detection model, we have used the SWaT
dataset, Tennessee Eastman process dataset and a dataset
corresponding to a Government sponsored power distribu-
tion testbed. Note that the training data contains both normal
and anomalous data points, so that algorithms that assume
training on normal condition are at a disadvantage.
5.1. Training Phase
5.1.1. Secure Water Treatement(SWaT) Testbed. The
SWaT dataset [9] comprises of reading from the sensors
and actuators of an operational water treatment testbed, at
different timestamp. The testbed comprises of 6 different
stages, where each stage signifies a water treatment process.
The physical parameters that are measured by the sensors
are level of the water in the tanks, differential pressure,
flow indicators etc. The actuators are different kind of
valves that can either be ON or OFF. The programmable
logic controllers (PLC) take the sensor reading as input and
give commands to the actuators accordingly. If the attacker
can manipulate the sensor readings then PLC will give
commands that are undesirable, resulting into an anomalous
behavior of the cyber-physical system. Commands can be
also given through SCADA and the overall state of the
system is maintained at SCADA. Manipulating the sensors
and actuators data in the SCADA will also have an undesired
effect on the system.
The SWaT dataset {xi, yi}mi=1, xi ∈ IRd, has m =
449919 and d = 51. The vector xi consists of reading of
actuators and sensors at ith timestamp. It is a labeled dataset
where yi is the label representing the state of the system
either under normal or under attack. Since RAD is designed
to work even with unlabelled data, it does not require the
labels. However, as a meta information the label tells that
88% data points are normal and rest 12% are attack. There
are 36 attack scenarios in this dataset.
We give the data matrix M which has xi’s as rows,
as an input to the PCP algorithm to recover the low rank
matrix L. The rank r of L is found to be 18. Figure 2 shows
the error ||M − L− S0||F where is the Frobenius norm of
the matrix M − L − S0 is considered, as the constraint in
the optimization problem was L + S0 = M . The stopping
criteria is set to an error less than 10−7||M ||F . PCP required
5970 epochs to perform the RPCA.
5.1.2. Tennessee-Eastman Process. The Tennessee-
Eastman process data is the dataset generated for the
research purpose of anomaly detection and fault diagnosis
of industrial control systems by simulating a chemical
plant [21]. The normal operation of the chemical plant is
simulated as well as attacks are simulated in the dataset by
manipulating a targeted set of variables.
In the TE process dataset {xi}4801i=1 , xi ∈ IR41, the
vector xi consists readings of sensors at each timestamp. In
the TE process dataset 83% data points belongs to normal
and the rest are observations corresponding to anomalous
behavior of the system. The data matrix M is of dimension
(4801 ∗ 41), was given to PCP to find a low rank matrix L
of rank r = 24. Figure 2 shows the corresponding error at
each epoch. The matrix A comprising of the orthonormal
basis vectors of L is of dimension (41 ∗ 24).
5.1.3. Govt. Sponsored Power Testbed . The power testbed
is a three phase power distribution testbed in which several
loads are connected like industrial automation testbed, con-
veyor belt and water treatment testbed. The various physical
parameters like voltages, current and power are measured
with the help of sensors and remote terminal unit (RTU)
and are sent to the SCADA from PLC by using industrial
communication protocols like MODBUS where the overall
state of the system is maintained.
The power testbed dataset {xi}12310i=1 has xi ∈ IR31.
The vector xi consists readings of sensors corresponding
to voltage, current, power and phase angle readings. The
first 12125 data points of this dataset belongs to normal
behavior of the system and the rest 185 are observations of
the system under attack.
The data matrix M is of dimension (12310 ∗ 31) is
given as an input to the PCP algorithm to recover the low
rank matrix L. The rank r of L is found to be 9. Figure 2
shows the corresponding error after each epoch. The matrix
A comprising of the orthonormal basis vectors of L is of
dimension (31 ∗ 9). The median is a (31 ∗ 1) vector.
5.2. Test Phase
For demonstration, we show how proposed intrusion
dection system RAD detects the attack under different attack
scenarios, for three datasets. We compare the performance
with other comparable methods.
Figure 2. Error ||M−L−S0||F calculated after each epochs for Principal
Component Persuit algorithm on SWaT, Tennessee and Power dataset. The
decreasing error shows that algorithm successfully recovers a low rank
matrix L
5.2.1. Secure Water Treatement(SWaT) Testbed.
Attack Scenario 1. In attack scenario 1, the attacker’s intent
is to overflow the tank 1 by attacking on the actuator MV-
101 to remain open even if the level indicator sensor LIT-
101 is above the highest permitted level. Figure 3 shows the
reading of the sensor LIT-101 at each time step. The highest
permitted level is 800mm. We can see that the attacker is
successfully overflowing the tank from the time step 1600
to 2600. This is denoted by the vertical bars which signifies
starting and stopping timestamp of the attack. After the
attack the level of tank comes within the permitted level.
Figure 3. Sensor LIT-101 showing ongoing attack
Figure 4 shows the corresponding anomaly score at each
time step. The blue horizontal line shows the normalized
threshold. It is normalized to one, since anomaly scores
are divided by actual threshold of that system, to make
different anomaly scores comparable. It can be observed
that RAD correctly identifies the start of the attack, as
the anomaly score exceeds the threshold. Again, when the
attack stops and the level of the water in the tank comes
within the permitted level the anomaly score drops below
threshold. This depicts RAD successfully identifying the
Figure 4. Normalized anomaly score at each time step shows RAD suc-
cessfully identifying the attack, while PASAD fails to identify it.
system behavior, however PASAD fails to flag the anomaly
because it’s anomaly score stays below the threshold.
Attack Scenario 2. In attack scenario 2, the attacker’s intent
is to overflow the tank 3 by attacking on the sensor LIT-
301 by increasing the level of the tank suddenly well above
the maximum level. The attacker did not stop and the tank
does overflow(> 900mm) for a period of time. 5 shows
the reading of the sensor LIT-301 at each time step. The
highest permitted level is 900. We can see that the attacker
is successfully overflowing the tank. After the attack the
level of tank comes within the permitted level.
Figure 5. Sensor LIT-301 reading at each time step
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Figure 6. Sharp rise in RAD anomaly score capturing the attack.
Figure 6 shows the anomaly score at each time step with
the blue horizontal line as the threshold. RAD anomaly score
captures the attack started and eventually when the level of
water is above the permitted level, it crosses the threshold.
After the attack, when level of the water comes within the
permitted level, the RAD anomaly score drops below the
threshold. The sharp drop in the anomaly score correspond-
ing to the sharp drop in the sensor reading describes that the
intrusion detection model can capture the deviation in the
system behavior. On the contrary, PASAD anomaly score
does not reflect the attack.
5.2.2. Tennessee Eastman Process Dataset.
Attack Scenario 1. In attack scenario 1, the attacker’s intent
is to increase the value of the sensor abruptly by gradually
increasing to a point well above the desired level. Figure 7
shows the reading of the sensor XMeas(14) with time when
the sensor is under attack.
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Figure 7. Xmeas(14) Sensor reading at each Time Step
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Figure 8. Anomaly Score at each Time Step
Attack Scenario 2. In attack scenario 2, the attacker’s intent
is to increase the value of the sensor abruptly by gradually
increasing to a point well above the desired level. Figure 9
shows the reading of the sensor XMeas(6) with time when
the sensor is under attack.
Figure 8 and Figure 10 show the anomaly score at each
time step, with the blue horizontal line as the threshold.
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Figure 9. Xmeas(6) Sensor reading at each Time Step
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Figure 10. Anomaly Score at each time step
It clearly shows that when the attack starts and eventu-
ally when the sensor reading is above the permitted level
the RAD anomaly score crosses the threshold flagging the
anomaly of the cyber-physical system. There is delayed
detection by PASAD in the attack scenario 1, but it for fails
to detect the attack in scenario 2.
5.2.3. Power Distribution Dataset. In this attack scenario,
the attacker’s intent is to increase the value of the sensor ‘PT
trans-contractor C3’, which is measures trans-conductance
in the third phase of a 3-phase power distribution test bed.
The attacker suddenly generates a spike in the reading.
Figure 11 shows the reading of the sensor XMeas(6) when
the sensor is under attack.
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Figure 11. PT transcontractor C3 sensor reading under attack
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Figure 12. Anomaly Score at each Time Step
Figure 12 shows the anomaly score at each time step
with the blue horizontal line as the threshold. It shows
that with a sudden abnormality in the behavior of the
cyber-physical system, the RAD anomaly score spikes, and
touches the threshold. PASAD anomaly score does not
respond to the attack.
5.3. Robustness in the presence of outliers in the
training data
In order to demonstrate robustness of RAD, we perform
experiment where we introduce two kinds of corruption
additionally into the training data which already contains
the normal and attack scenario as described before.
• Gaussian Noise: We introduce N(0, 1) Gaussian
noise to the whole training data.
• Burst Outliers: Few variables are corrupted at regular
interval consecutively for some time interval.
Tennessee Eastman Process Dataset. The variables
XMeas(6) and XMeas(14) are corrupted at a regular in-
terval of 25 time steps. Additionally Gaussian noise was
introduced to the entire training data.
Figure 13 shows the reading of a variable Xmeas(6) after
outliers are injected at regular intervals. The spikes in the
reading depicts the outliers in the varaible. Similar ouliers
were introduced in the XMeas(14).
Figure 13. Xmeas(6) sensor reading after outlier injection in training
At the test time the variable XMeas(14) was attacked as
depicted earlier in the Figure 7. Figure 14 shows the RAD
anomaly score at the corresponding time steps. Successful
detection of attack shows the robustness of RAD to detect
the anomalies, even though additional outliers in the form of
Gaussian noise or random jitter, were present in the training
data. Comparing to 10 we can see the PASAD anomaly score
have worsened, due to further training data corruption and
it is below the threshold.
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Figure 14. Anomaly score corresponding to attack in the test time on
variable XMeas(14)
6. Real-time Deployment and Memory Re-
quirement
As discussed in Section 4.2, in order to calculate
anomaly score to generate alarms in the test time, we
shall require parameters {A,m, θ} and vectors {ATxi,xi}.
Considering the power distribution dataset, where d = 31
and r = 9. The matrix A be (31∗9) dimensional and scalar
is 4 bytes, the memory required to store the parameters, is
(31∗9+31∗2+9+1)∗4 = 1404 bytes, which is 1.404KB.
The general-purpose machines in which the SCADA soft-
ware operates have a RAM of 256MB and running simple
code for matrix multiplication, and a conditional operation
is feasible. Therefore, the proposed IDS is feasible to be
deployed in real infrastructure within the SCADA host to
detect attacks in real-time.
Generally, Programmable Logic Controllers(PLC) have
Internal RAM of 4MB. To store a single floating point value
in the BMXRMS008MP Schnieder PLC requires a 16bit
word i.e, is 2bytes. The memory required to store our IDS
in this particular PLC is 702 bytes, which is less than a KB.
If matrix multiplication and comparison of two variables are
allowed in the PLC, which is generally possible using STL
language, then our proposed IDS can be deployed within
PLC.
7. Conclusion
Developing intrusion detection system for cyber-physical
systems is necessary because of their critical nature and
vulnerability to attacks. Slight change in their behavioral
dynamics can significantly impact the real-world installa-
tions. Moreover, a live cyber-physical system can not be
trusted to be operating under desired normal condition.
Therefore, a robust training method for IDS is necessary.
The proposed Robust Anomaly Detection (RAD) method
tolerates corruption and attacks in the training data and
successfully detects an ongoing attack in the cyber-physical
system in O(d) time. This paper experimentally demon-
strates the performance of the proposed IDS in multiple
data set by considering different attack scenario. It can be
deployed efficiently within the SCADA host as well as PLC
using matrix multiplication.
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